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Abstract
Freedom House has declared that the press in Venezuela is “Not Free.” Major U.S. news media have also
painted this picture for the public through their reporting on the Chávez government and its relation to
the country’s media. This paper uses historical case studies of U.S. response to the revolutionary
governments in Guatemala and Chile to, particularly where it relates to manipulation of media, to
illuminate the connection between the political and economic interests of the U.S. government and
media coverage of the press climate under the Chávez government in Venezuela. I make the argument
that historical understanding of relationships between hegemonic U.S. interests in the region and media
reflections of those interests casts criticisms of the Chávez government’s treatment of the press in a
new light, revealing bias against the administration of the Bolivarian Revolution rather than objective
presentation of fact.
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In its 2015 report on freedom of the press around the world, U.S. based nonprofit
Freedom House, a self-proclaimed human rights watchdog, classified the Venezuelan press as
“not free.” One of five Latin American nations thus designated, Venezuela was ranked among
the least free nations globally with a score of 81 (100 being “least free”), just 9 points better
than Syria and Iran and several points less free than the press in Iraq and Egypt. With a
democratically structured government and a constitutionally protected right to freedom of
expression, it is surprising that Venezuela would be found so low on this list, just 10 points
more free than its regional compatriot Cuba on a scoring scale of 100 with lower scores
signifying more freedom. The other three Latin American nations also classified as “not free,” –
Mexico, Ecuador, and Honduras – all received scores of 63, 64, and 68 respectively.1
This critical report emanates from an organization whose principal supporters include
the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, among other
Western governmental organizations and U.S. foundations and businesses. This connection
raises the question about whether the criticism from U.S.-based media and monitoring
organizations concerning the Venezuelan government’s approach to the press stems more from
economic and political interests of the U.S. government in the country than from genuine
interest in championing press freedom rights in the far reaches of the world.
According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries February 2016 oil
market report, the U.S. exhibited the highest demand for oil in the world in 2015.2 OPEC
statistics on its 12 member countries show that in 2014 Venezuela held the largest share of
crude oil reserves in the world at 24.9 percent – out of the 80 percent of proven crude oil
1
2

Freedom House. “Freedom of the Press 2015.” 2015. p.23
OPEC. “Monthly Oil Market Report – February 2016.” 2016. p. 35

Lamb 2
reserves held by OPEC member nations.3 It seems a reasonable assumption that the nation with
the highest demand for oil would be closely attentive to the goings on in a nation with great
potential to meet that need, especially when the resources are just next door.
In this paper, I aim to probe this question of motivation for criticism of press freedom in
Venezuela by examining historic examples of the U.S. government’s interventionist policies in
efforts to protect and further its economic and political interests in Latin America. Upon close
examination of the efforts to overthrow Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 and the
relationship between the U.S. and Salvador Allende in the 1970-’73 revolutionary period in
Chile, U.S. media criticism of the treatment of the press in Venezuela will be seen in a new light.
This paper will address this thesis first by reviewing U.S media coverage and criticism of
the Venezuelan government’s policies and presence, also examining the trends in information
sourcing among U.S. media. I will then lay out a historical context for the development of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez with special attention to
developments in the oil and media industries and how they are connected to U.S. political and
economic interests in the country and region. I will then move into case studies of the
Guatemalan and Chilean revolutions and subsequent coups as historical examples to support
my argument that press freedom and democracy promotion in general are much lower
priorities for U.S. government officials than objectives like protection of business interests and
political hegemony in Latin America.

3
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II. U.S. Media Coverage of Venezuelan Situation
Since he was elected to the Venezuelan presidency in 1998, Hugo Chávez and his
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have attracted media attention the world over, both critical
and favorable coverage of the revolutionary leader’s policies and persona. The aim of the next
few pages is to take a look at some of the patterns in this media coverage of Venezuela and its
revolutionary government under Chávez from a few internationally respected publications: The
New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal.
In December of 1998, Chávez was popularly elected to the Venezuelan presidency,
marking the end of the decades-long reign of the nation’s two major political parties: Acción
Democrática and Copei. The rupture of the traditional political scene drew international
attention to the new president, especially given his political past. In an article published on the
day of his election, The Washington Post identified Venezuela’s new executive as a “failed coup
leader” and a “populist” in its headline, while the story’s first sentence stated his election
created uncertainty about the future of the nation's 40-year-old democracy.”4 The New York
Times article on the same subject also used Chávez’ attempted coup of 1992 as front page
headline bait, also setting up a contrast between him and his challenger, the “Yale-educated
businessman, Henrique Salas Romer,” in its opening paragraphs.5 The story did, however, seem
to paint Chávez as a politician honestly seeking change, though it’s made clear that change will
rankle his opposition.
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The newly elected Chávez appears in these two articles to be a mystery as a political
figure, but one in charge of one of the leading suppliers of oil to the United States at the time –
13 percent of crude imported to U.S. arrived from Venezuela, a value of $4.95 billion.6
Previously barred from visiting the U.S. because of his leadership of an attempted coup, Chávez
was quickly accepted by the Clinton administration and invited to visit Washington before his
inauguration in early February.7 A Washington Post article published just days after the
December election airs the early perspective of Chávez, stating that the Clinton administration
promised the continuation of a “traditionally strong relationship” so long as Chávez refrained
from implementing “promised radical political or economic measures.”8
Just two years later, during Chavez’s third year in office, a New York Times article paints
Chávez as approaching tyranny in his treatment of the Venezuelan private media. The story’s
first two paragraphs set up a direct contradiction between Chávez’s assertions of press
protection upon his election and his later “blistering critiques of the press.” 9 The story’s central
conflict between Chávez and the media is, however, generally speculative and without concrete
actions from the government against the media. The writer, Juan Forero, states, “the
government has yet to restrict the news media,” in the midst of a sentence aimed at painting
parts of the Venezuelan Constitution as a potential weapon of the government – the clause
singled out as potentially trouble-making is called the “truthful information clause.”10
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The story’s sourcing of information is also problematic. The presentation of sources is an
editorial decision that can change a story’s entire angle. Though quoted sources on both sides
of the issue are quantitatively equal, they are very unbalanced qualitatively. Critical voices of
Chávez come from a “Bush administration official in Washington,” an editor of Caracas
opposition paper Tal Cual, and a researcher for the New York-based Committee to Protect
Journalists.11 Support for Chávez was given through selected quotes from a speech Chávez gave
himself, only once quoted in full context, Chávez’ defense minister, and a random Chávez
supporter on the street.12 All three of these sources give shallow defenses when compared to
the official U.S. line offered from the critical sources.
On April 12, 2002, Hugo Chávez was forcibly removed from power by his opposition and
replaced by businessman Pedro Carmona. Two days later, Chávez was restored to the
presidency, but his brief absence and the role of the Venezuelan private media in both
instigating and perpetuating it, was the subject of media frenzy. On April 13, 2002, The New
York Times issued an editorial applauding the removal of Chávez as a victory for democracy,
claiming in its first sentence that the president had resigned his post. The story stated, “Mr.
Chavez, a ruinous demagogue, stepped down after the military intervened and handed power
to a respected business leader, Pedro Carmona.”13 The piece also went on to discuss the
benefits in oil policy Washington stood to gain from Chávez removal, explicitly stating,
“Washington has a strong stake in Venezuela’s recovery,” also listing other regional interests
for Washington in the removal of Chávez, but calling the coup “a purely Venezuelan affair,”

11
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effectively denying direct involvement from Washington in the extra-constitutional removal of
the president.14 An editorial from The Washington Post published the same day laid the blame
for the coup at the feet of Chávez himself, at once calling for a return to democracy but
pardoning the abandonment of democracy as the consequence of the bad behavior of
Venezuela’s “terrible leader.”15 The claim of Chávez’ resignation would later be corrected and
the coup recognized for its true nature in subsequent coverage, but the fact remains that the
initial reaction of prominent U.S. news media was to celebrate the removal of a democratically
elected president by undemocratic means.
In the aftermath of the coup, the role the private news media of Venezuela played in
the attempted abortion of Chávez’ presidency received scant coverage, and the attention it was
given seemed to paint the private media as a victim of the tyranny that was almost removed.
During the 2002 coup, the private media manipulated coverage to aid the coup plotters in
overthrowing Chávez, a situation that will be discussed in more detail later. A piece from the
Wall Street Journal published days after the president’s return to power sported the following
headline: “News media face questions on role in Chávez coup – president’s supporters turn
against reporters; longstanding antagonism.”16 The article’s first sentence states the “alleged
favoritism” news media shows to opposition forces in Venezuela is “subjecting the media to
wrath on the streets and scrutiny in Congress.”17 Here the story has let the reader know who is
the protagonist of this story – the media – and who is the antagonist – the Chavista left
controlling the streets and the legislature. The story, centered on the impending investigation
14
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into the media’s role in “fomenting last week’s frustrated effort to oust Mr. Chávez,” quotes
only one Chávez administration official but lets two private media moguls dominate the
article’s dialogue. The story leaves off looking toward another “potential form of censorship”
for the private media in a regulatory media law heading toward debate in Venezuela’s
legislature.18
Conflict between the media and the government in Venezuela also received coverage
from U.S. media during the beginnings of the presidency of Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’ chosen
successor, who was elected in 2013 to take the helm of the revolution. The 2013
announcement of the impending sale of privately owned Venezuelan television station
Globovision drew much media scrutiny as a deep blow to press freedom in the country. The
station, described as the last independent network in Venezuela, operated as a bastion of the
opposition and was one of the private stations involved in coverage blackouts surrounding
Chávez’ return to power after the coup in April 2002 that removed him from power. An article
from The New York Times describes the network’s sale as the end of critical debate, quoting an
analyst from the Committee to Protect Journalists as saying, "If what is being announced comes
to pass, then we would have a broadcast spectrum inundated with voices close to officialdom.
And that will hurt audiences, who will have fewer options. Distinct, opposing voices feed
democracy."19
A piece from the editorial board at The Washington Post on the network’s sale said
Globovision’s situation represented a stepping up of “the offensive [Chávez] led against

18
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democratic institutions in Venezuela and across Latin America.”20 Likewise, a Wall Street
Journal editorial asserted the sale was forced by the Venezuelan government “to silence the
last major television voice not under its control.”21
In a point of comparison of coverage, the government of Mauricio Macri in Argentina,
elected to the presidency in 2015, exhibited behavior that could be termed an assault on press
freedom by announcing on March 28, 2016, it would pull its investment stake in regional media
outlet Telesur. The public, multi-state sponsored broadcast network is the brainchild of the
Bolivarian government in Venezuela, founded in 2005 as an alternative news source for Latin
America in competition with outlets like CNN Español or privately owned media. U.S. media
coverage of the decision to break with Telesur in the days following the announcement
consisted of reprints of an Associated Press wire report and a single original bulletin in the New
York Times that amounted to 176 words in the paper’s late edition.22 Considering the
vehemence expressed in the media against lesser offenses against private media in Venezuela,
the lack of coverage of this explicit rejection of a media voice is conspicuous. Just days before
this announcement, President Barack Obama was in Argentina on a diplomatic visit to explore
the relationship moving forward between the newly elected center-right Macri and the U.S.
government. Macri, whose election has introduced tension in the Argentina-Venezuela
relationship as noted by the article, replaces Chávez-friendly executive Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner at Argentina’s helm.23
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Coverage of Venezuela by the prominent U.S. media outlets The New York Times, The
Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal during the presidency of Hugo Chávez have
exhibited an editorial slant against the Bolivarian revolution’s policies, even going so far as to
ignore the demands of democracy in order to declare its stance against him. This is not to say
that these outlets are maliciously aiming to stir unrest or opposition with their reporting.
Rather, these examples of coverage of the Chavista regimes in Venezuela illustrate the way the
U.S. media’s denunciation of Chávez’s policies, particularly in relation to the treatment of
private media, flow from an acceptance of dominant social attitudes toward the left in Latin
America and of the righteous intentions and objectivity of organizations like the Committee to
Protect Journalists, the Inter-American Press Association, and Freedom House, from which
coverage is often sourced and which have the backing of government institutions like the U.S.
Department of State. This reliance on official sources as a driver of the news is a pitfall that
manifests itself in many ways – some far less direct than an editorial explicitly siding against an
enemy of the United States government.
In a news story, structure is highly important. In fact, in my own personal experience,
structure and framing of a story is taught before basic mechanics of journalistic writing. The
beginning of any news story that’s been well done will lead with what it considers to be the
most important or vital information the reader needs to know and then work its way down to
less important content. In this “inverted pyramid” structure of writing, as it is termed in the
industry, the information at the end of the story is what the writer or editor determines to be
background, contextual information not immediately necessary to understand the story. As
Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon write in their examination of bias in news media, “The
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structure of a news article can convey a distinct ideological bias.”24 Given this general rule of
news writing, a bias in U.S. coverage of Venezuela becomes clear when article after article
opens its story with official U.S. government or NGO sources and leaves critical voices to speak
from the story’s conclusion.
Lee and Solomon go on to examine other ways coverage by U.S. media of human rights
abuses – like repression of freedom of the press – are influenced by the government. A New
York Times correspondent in Central America in the ‘80s, James LeMoyne is quoted as saying
coverage of human rights is “policy driven.”25 Examples of this are found in the U.S. reporting
on the closure of or violence against several publications in Central America. The closure of
prominent opposition outlet La Prensa in Nicaragua by the Sandinista government was widely
covered “as an example of Sandinista totalitarianism,”26 while U.S. media nearly ignored the
actions of counter-revolutionary forces in El Salvador against the press – one editor was
murdered and another media office was attacked.27 The U.S. government was actively opposed
to the Sandinistas and aided the Salvadoran government and military in their fight against the
revolutionary guerillas. These are but a few of several instances in which there are clear
correlations between U.S. political and economic interests in a region and coverage of human
rights violations in that region.
With this understanding of the way freedom of the press in Venezuela under Chávez
was generally covered by some of the major news outlets in the U.S., a review of the political
and economic interests in Venezuela as well as a deeper look at the media situation under
24
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Chávez will illuminate some of the ways U.S. media coverage of Venezuela may not be
presenting the whole, objective picture to the public. There are layers of interests and beliefs
about the press as an institution that affect coverage, and the context of Venezuela needs to be
understood to deconstruct the strong criticism coming from U.S. media.

III. Historical Review of the Bolivarian revolution
Hugo Chávez was elected to the presidency of Venezuela on December 6, 1998, with a
56 percent majority of the popular vote. This political outsider represented the collapse of the
old Venezuelan political system in favor of a movement toward Chávez’s new nation, The
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The new president promised radical changes for Venezuela,
including a new constitution and better management of Venezuela’s life-blood: its oil.
In this section of the study, I will be reviewing the historical context of this Bolivarian
Revolution and the policy highlights of the Chávez government (1998-2014). This review will
progress chronologically beginning with a background sweep of Venezuela’s oil economy and
democratic politics and will move into examinations of Chávez’s relationships with oil and
media respectively to draw out the parallel interests of the private media and the old oil elite
against Chávez’s nationalization policies and increased control over the lucrative oil industry in
Venezuela. In looking at these closely connected groups, it can be seen that the U.S.
government, as an importer dependent on Venezuelan oil and also a potential investor in the
oil industry, has an interest in supporting the opposition’s aims and standing in opposition to
Chávez’s policies.
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Background: Oil and Political Development
Venezuela’s massive oil reserves began to be highly exploited in the early 20 th century
when a foreign oil company, Royal Dutch Shell, struck liquid gold in 1914. Many other foreign
companies followed suit, and by 1928 Venezuela was the world’s largest oil exporter.28 Another
source states Venezuela’s exports were dominated by oil at 91.2 percent by 1935.29 This
dominance of the oil industry in the economy meant that other sectors suffered as their
production capabilities were outpaced by the demand fostered by flowing oil wealth. Domestic
industry and agriculture shrank dramatically throughout the 20th century, and consumer goods
and food came increasingly from imports.30 This economic direction away from agriculture led
to urbanization, and Venezuela “rapidly became the second most urbanized country of Latin
America.”31 Politically, this rise in oil importance meant that the traditional elite class in Latin
America – the large agricultural landowners – was weak in Venezuela, but the dominance of
foreign companies until the industry was nationalized prevented a local class of “oil barons”
from moving into the forefront of the political arena.32
Filling the role of political architects were the dominant political parties through the
mechanism of the state as the regulator of the oil industry.33 In the 1940s, the Venezuelan state
began to take steps toward national control of the oil industry where the government was
given a larger stake in the profits of the oil companies, and government involvement grew
28
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moving forward until the oil production industry in Venezuela was nationalized in 1973 by
President Carlos Andres Perez.34 This nationalization did little to put the government in
effective charge of the industry, catering to former international owners through contracting
terms, pricing, and a board of directors chosen from the company’s own management.35 In the
1990s, the industry began to open up again to external forces by encouraging investment and
partnerships from international companies.36 This liberalization of the oil industry would
become a central point of blame from Chávez whose platform targeted the national oil
company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) for reform and stronger control by the state.
The democracy established following the end of the dictatorship of Marcos Perez
Jimenez aimed for political stability in the form of the 1958 “Pact of Punto Fijo” through which
the dominant mainstream parties Acción Democrática (AD), Comité de Organización Politica
Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and the lesser Unión Republicana Democrática (URD) agreed
to circle the wagons against political upheaval to the country’s new democracy. The threats
perceived: radical parties’ gaining power – particularly Communists – and explosive tensions
from one party dominating the political sphere.37 What resulted was a consistent rule by the
pacted parties until the 1990s and the election of Rafael Caldera.38
The stability of the Punto Fijo democracy eventually became a liability, the two parties
not taking innovative approaches to changing social and economic realities of Venezuela.39 The
late ‘70s marked the beginning of a long-term downturn for the Venezuelan economy due to
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the country's large foreign debt and increasing production costs combined with a growing
population and the decreasing price of oil on the global market.40 The country, at the mercy of
oil, had little defense against the income squeeze. Gregory Wilpert, in his survey of the
Venezuelan government of Chávez, cites the poverty rate in 1996 to have reached 65 percent of
the population, and the hardship served as a shock to the system for a middle class that had
grown accustomed to a standard of living bolstered by oil booms.41
The resources the political parties used to maintain their control over the state were
dwindling and the response was to turn to loans from the International Monetary Fund which
brought along neo-liberal reforms under Carlos Andres Perez in 1989. The belt-tightening from
these “structural adjustment” packages – adopted in contradiction to Perez’s campaign
messages – caused popular rioting that in February 1989 culminated in deadly clashes between
the army and protesters called the “Caracazo.”42 Punto Fijo democracy was meeting its end,
and following his failed attempt to overthrow the Perez government in 1992, Colonel Hugo
Chávez began to emerge as the way toward a new beginning.
The election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 represented a significant break with the dominant
pattern of economics in Latin America, where neo-liberalism ruled during the end of the 20th
century.43 By the end of his first year in office, Chávez had the new constitution he had
promised passed with 72 percent of the vote.44 This constitution introduced several changes to
the political system of Venezuela, including the name of the country itself. Among the rights
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enshrined by the document are human rights (civil and social), health care as an “obligation of
the state” – women’s rights, indigenous rights, and of particular interest to this study, the right
to information.45
In 2000, in accordance with demands of the new constitution, every elected official in
the newly renamed Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, including the president himself, was
subject to an election process to “re-legitimate” their post.46 With this “mega-election” and the
subsequent appointments by the now Chavista-dominated National Assembly, the Bolivarian
Revolution was able to solidify the transition of the political system out of the hands of the
Punto Fijo parties.47
Chávez and Oil
Also among Chávez’s top priorities at the outset of his presidency was the righting of the
oil ship. Global oil prices were bottoming out when Chávez came to the presidency, and the
new president set his sights on strengthening the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) to drive prices back up, an effort which saw rapid results.48 OPEC’s efforts to
raise and maintain oil prices, which rose from record lows around $7 per barrel at the end of
1998 to just above $20 per barrel by December 1999, was dubbed “nothing less than economic
warfare,” by U.S. Senator Charles Schumer.49 This reaction foreshadows the conflict brewing
over the conflicting interests in Venezuelan oil between the United States as importer and
exporter Chávez’s mission to transform Venezuela with oil income.
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In initial domestic approaches to the state oil company, the Chávez administration
concretely protected PDVSA as the property of the government with the 1999 constitution, in
rejection of the movements to privatize the company from Chavez’s predecessors. 50 As far as
actual policy action in reforming the company’s management, however, Chávez was fairly
cautious in the beginning. While ownership of the company was held squarely by the
government, international involvement wasn’t much affected until the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law
raised royalties on oil extractions by all companies involved from their previous 16.6 percent to
30 percent.51 This short-circuited previous business schemes that allowed profits to be hidden
away in international subsidiaries in order to cut the tax income the government received from
oil ventures.52 The law also required that the Venezuelan state hold a majority investment in
any partner venture with international oil companies concerning “actividades primarias,”53
which is activity associated with extracting and transporting unrefined crude oil. In 2005, this
law was taken a step further by shifting the “operating agreements” held by 32 companies
operating oil fields in the country – established during oil liberalization moves in the ‘90s – to
the legal category of “jointly owned enterprises,”54 by which they would be subject to the 2001
Hydrocarbon Law’s income tax rates and majority control by the Venezuelan government.
The legal framework of PDVSA’s management wasn’t the only aspect of the company
Chávez reformed. The upper sectors of PDVSA personnel in Chávez’s early years as executive
comprised an opposition sector to his plans for the company – a conflict that moved into the
open during the oil industry strike from December 2002 to February 2003. During the strike,
50
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organized by the opposition to Chávez (i.e. old political elite), more than 18,000 oil industry
workers from the “white collar” sectors of the company walked away from their posts in an
action organized by the company's managers and eventually were fired.55 The Chávez
government was able to restart production and reorganize the leadership of the company to
bring it into closer allegiance to the government.56
During this strike, another crucial aspect of external control over the oil industry was
revealed. Technical operations and data processing for PDVSA had been sourced to a U.S.
company called Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) – the joint venture in
Venezuela created by this partnership was called INTESA.57 INTESA blacked out its services to
PDVSA as part of the strike, essentially locking the company out of its own data processing
systems. It was later revealed that SAIC, the majority owner of the joint enterprise, had strong
connections to the U.S. defense industry, raising questions that have yet to be answered about
the involvement of the U.S. company in the strike aimed at crippling the Chávez government.58
As his presidency marched on, Chávez consolidated the control of the government over
oil, aiming to stamp out dependence on what he deemed imperialistic powers controlling his
country’s economy. Part of this exercise of control over oil was the regional integration in Latin
America through energy agreements.59 Additionally, Chávez explored relationships with
potential markets for Venezuelan oil in China, Russia, and other market giants, lessening the
dependence on U.S. purchases. Chávez also tightened his relationship with Fidel Castro,
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agreeing to provide oil at a discounted cost to the fellow socialist revolutionary. 60 These
connections with U.S. rivals in the world market – and a regional sore spot in Cuba – would
probably have been perceived by the U.S. government as a challenge to U.S. influence in the
region, especially given Chávez’s outspoken rhetoric against U.S. influence.
In summary, the approach to oil Chávez’s government pursued was one of continually
stripping away the autonomy previously held by PDVSA and bringing the company closer and
closer to heel. The company’s earlier outward orientation – structured in such a way as to
minimize profits turned over to the state61 – was gradually forced inward through tax reform
and redefinition of enterprise ownership. This process in turn removed power from
international oil investors and companies operating in the country, including investors from the
U.S. Additionally, Chávez moved the region as a whole toward energy integration while working
to box out U.S. economic influence and break dependency of Venezuela’s oil economy on the
major market in the U.S. through new trade partnerships. Old political and oil industry elites
being removed from spaces of influence stood in vehement opposition to Chávez and his
policies, and it can be seen that the U.S. as an importer of Venezuelan oil and home to
traditional investors in the industry stood to lose as well from the increasing nationalization of
PDVSA and oil wealth.
Chávez and Media
In 1998, the year of Chávez’s election, the media landscape in Venezuela was dominated
by private outlets. In broadcast media, for example, the ratio of private stations to public ones
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was 18 to one, respectively.62 Data on television market shares in 1996 show that Venevisión –
a company in the powerful Grupo Cisneros conglomerate – held 50 percent of the market and
RCTV – a station owned by Grupo Phelps – held 30 percent.63 As mentioned before, in his 1998
election Chávez received support from a broad base of society, including some of the mass
media. Gustavo Cisneros, of Grupo Cisneros, threw his weight behind the Chávez campaign.64
However, as Gregory Wilpert suggests, this initial acceptance of Chávez turned to rancor as the
new president managed to wrest political control nearly completely from old party elites during
his first years in office. It was these elites who held sway over the nation’s mass media.65
Richard Gott writes in his book examining the Bolivarian Revolution that the owners of
the major television networks in Venezuela – Venevisión, RCTV, Globovisión, and Televen –
“were among the wealthiest individuals in the country.”66 Grupo Cisneros, owner of Venevisión
and one of the most powerful media groups in Venezuela when Chávez came to power, was
headed by Gustavo Cisneros, whom Gott describes as intimately linked to political and
commercial groups in the United States.”67 Mike Gonzalez also makes these connections in his
biography of Chávez, writing Cisneros was an owner in the Pepsi-Cola franchise, a member of
an advisory board for Chase Manhattan Bank, and was in contact with the U.S. government
during preparations for the April 2002 coup.68 The Grupo Cisneros headquarters did relocate to
Miami, Florida, in 2000 as part of an effort apparently to “restructure its operations in
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Venezuela around its international communications operations.”69 According to Gott, the
Caracas newspapers were also linked to old party control. Editor of El Universal Andrés Mata
and editor of El Nacional Miguel Henrique Otero, he says, were “formerly associated with
Acción Democrática.”70 Otero would go on to form political opposition group Movimiento 2D,
while also retaining his post at the helm of El Universal.
The initially receptive relationship of the media to Chávez began to sour with the
enacting of Chávez’s Bolivarian Constitution in 1999. One of the rights specifically enshrined in
the new constitution is the right to information. Article 58 protects the right to “timely, truthful
and impartial information, without censorship,”71 a qualification ultimately included after
strong debate.72 This clause was decried by opponents as a potential weapon of the
government to silence troublesome media. Another early source of contention between Chávez
and the media was the president’s use of “cadenas” – or required broadcasts – to present his
government’s message to the masses. These broadcasts would override whatever programming
the television stations had lined up. As it became clear just what kind of radical transformation
Chávez planned on bringing to Venezuela, the media drew closer and closer to the opposition
voices from wealthy, old-party elites. An article in a 2005 edition of the Columbia Journalism
Review states that Venezuelan journalists have admitted their discarding of objective
journalism to “spearhead an opposition movement against Chávez.”73
This opposition movement came to a head in 2002 with an attempted coup d’état
against Chávez. On April 11, 2002, protests organized by opposition groups in the streets of
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Caracas turned violent, and Chávez was blamed for the bloodshed. Chávez was arrested, taken
out of Caracas, held under military guard, and replaced by businessman and opposition leader
Pedro Carmona Estanga at the head of the Venezuelan government. The coup leadership
proceeded to dismantle the state apparatus, operating under the fabricated claim that Chávez
had agreed to resign the presidency, before loyal military members retook the presidential
palace and restored Chávez to power on April 14, 2002.74
The April coup illuminated the lengths the private media was willing to go to in order to
rid their country of Hugo Chávez. Gott accuses the owners of prominent media outlets of
colluding in the advance plotting to remove Chávez.75 Andres Izarra, later to become Chávez’s
minister of communication and information, was a journalist at RCTV when the coup took
place. In the month before the coup, Izarra said, an anti-Chávez demonstration was covered at
length by the station while the march of Chávez supporters was ignored.76
On April 11, the four major TV stations aired extensive coverage of another opposition
protest connected to a national strike. As reported by Izarra in the Columbia Journalism Review,
this coverage included “on-air admonitions for people to join the strike and the day’s march.”77
When the opposition and pro-Chávez marches collided and gunfire broke out, the television
stations aired footage edited to show Chávez supporters firing into the crowd of opposition
marchers. In reality, “the shots were fired by snipers on the roof of the Eden Hotel, beside the
bridge, and the man photographed firing his pistol from the bridge was a government
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supporter firing back at them.”78 Chávez used the cadena broadcast system in an attempt to
control the situation on the airwaves, but the private television stations split the screen to
simultaneously show a Chávez speech and the violence in the streets around Miraflores, the
presidential palace.79 The only government television channel, Canal Ocho, was removed from
the air by coup plotters.80
The manipulation of the footage by the private media served the interest of the coup
plotters as several generals publicly blamed Chávez for the outbreak of violence. One on-air call
for the removal of Chávez, a statement from an officer of the Venezuelan navy, accused the
president of “massacring innocent people with snipers.” This broadcast is alleged to have been
pre-recorded earlier that day “in the presence of several journalists.”81 In the early hours of
Friday, April 12, Chávez was removed from power, and the principal private television stations
entered a new phase of coup engineering. Leaders of the overthrow appeared on television
falsely asserting that Chávez had capitulated to the military’s request for his resignation.82
Private media aired entertainment content rather than cover the chaos abounding in the
nation’s capital as the coup government led by Pedro Carmona went about its work on Friday.83
Izarra said he was given orders to send his RCTV reporters in search of “live shots of
tranquility,” while protests in the city claimed the lives of 19 people in total from both sides of
the conflict.84
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On Saturday the coup government under Carmona struggled to maintain control as
support from the military for the removal of Chávez began to splinter. The heads of the four
major private television stations and the prominent newspapers El Universal and El Nacional
were gathered to meet with interim president Carmona at Miraflores.85 On Sunday, as the
Carmona government rapidly deteriorated, the major news media were silent on the
resurgence of Chávez support. The Columbia Journalism Review reports that RCTV had an
exclusive coverage opportunity of the military commander in Maracay asserting his unit’s
support for Chávez, but Izarra, the editor for the report, was ordered to keep the coverage off
the air.86 Similarly, El Universal and El Nacional published no Sunday edition of their papers,
“whose lead stories should have been on the crumbling coup and Chávez’s imminent return to
power.”87 When popular protests against the coup spurred the presidential guard to retake
Miraflores, the private television stations aired “cartoons and old movies.”88
Though the April coup failed, the private media remained on the attack against Chávez.
During the oil shutdown that began in December 2002, the four main television stations acted
as cheerleaders for the strike, donating air time for pro-strike advertisements.89 Here in this
opposition offensive in the media can also be found traces of U.S. government support for the
actions of the private media to undermine Chávez. Gregory Wilpert writes that a media
campaign funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development through its private channel
Development Alternatives, Inc. received around $10,000 in order to collaborate with then head
of Fedecamaras Carlos Fernandez for the promotion of “the values of a modern and democratic
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society breaking with the patterns of paternalism and populism,”90 through radio and television
commercials. The project’s dates of funding line up with the oil strike’s duration from
December to February, and Fernandez was a leader of the strike which was being cheered by
the television stations. Wilpert asserts that the USAID funding in fact produced the
advertisements on behalf of the strike.91
In the years after the coup, the private media kept up its anti-Chávez litany, but also
faced increasing scrutiny and distrust from the Chávez government. Upon regaining power,
Chávez initiated an investigation into the role of the media in his overthrow.92 In 2004, a new
media law was enacted to govern “the social responsibility of the presenters of radio and
television services,” and the electronic media industry as a whole.93 The law provides a
schedule of programming that aims at restricting content with sexual, violent, or language
laden content during hours when children would be engaging with media.94 Critics of the law
say it acts as a “strategy to silence opposition media,” through its content restriction.95
The law appears to have much in common with Federal Communication Commission
regulations regarding the broadcast of indecent or profane material in the U.S. Between 6 a.m.
and 10 p.m., broadcasters must adhere to the FCC’s indecency standard “to protect children
from harmful content.” The FCC has the power to “issue civil monetary penalties, revoke a
license, and deny a renewal application,” for those broadcasters who fail to adhere to FCC
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regulations.96 Likewise, Venezuela’s “Resorte Law,” as the social responsibility law is called, is
enforced by the Venezuela National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL), which has
power over licensing and fines for radio, television, and electronic media according to the
Organic Telecommunications Law.97 The Resorte Law, however, has been cited by U.S.-based
media watchdogs like Freedom House as a factor in the Chávez regime’s oppression of press
freedom.98 Indeed, beyond just delineating content schedules, Article 29 of the law does
prescribe the revocation of broadcast concessions that “are in opposition to national
security.”99 It should be noted, though, that since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the
U.S. media is also more closely managed in consideration of “national security,” and the
Venezuelan government had already experienced the highest of threats to national security
from the private media itself in the April 2002 coup. The letter of the law may appear harsh and
restrictive to a society like the U.S., with a long history of stability in political and press
institutions, but the Venezuelan context is a very different beast.
In 2007, Venezuela’s private media attracted international attention when it was
announced that the broadcast license of RCTV, the nation’s most popular television channel,
would not be renewed. The Venezuelan government defended the decision as the station’s just
consequences for its role in the 2002 coup and other broadcast law violations.100 However, the
decision was labeled an assault on press freedom in Venezuela by international groups like the
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Inter-American Press Association and the Committee to Protect Journalists.101 Wilpert makes
the point that the removal of RCTV from the airwaves may not be a blow to press freedom
since the station had already proven itself to be a decidedly non-objective voice and the
vacuum could be filled by a new, more truly free voice:
“Taking RCTV off the air does restrict freedom of speech if you believe that this is
measured by the freedom of those who own the resources for using the airwaves. If,
however, freedom of speech means that every view – regardless of its holder’s personal
wealth – has an equal opportunity to be broadcast, then the degree of freedom of
speech in Venezuela actually depends on what RCTV will be replaced with.”102
RCTV was replaced by government channel TVes. A BBC report from 2012 shows however, that
the distribution of television audience shares in Venezuela, despite this removal of a highly
popular channel, left the private media far ahead of state owned channels in market share.
Venevisión alone claimed 26.18 percent of the television audience. Data from CONATEL in the
same report listed 70.36 percent of TV and radio ownership to be privately held versus the
government’s 4.5 percent.103
The missing piece of the Venezuelan media puzzle is found in the country’s community
media. This same BBC brief reported that community media owned 25.05 percent of radio and
television media in 2012.104 Early communications laws and regulations from the Chávez
government created the space for community media to emerge, and the dominant private
outlets’ use of their control over the media landscape to warp political action and debate in
favor of the opposition groups spurred the desire for communities to take control of their
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information systems.105 One example of this community media is television outlet Catia TVe.
Though dependent on funds from the airing of government-created material, the station sees
itself as a legitimate part of the revolutionary state formation by involving members of its
neighborhood in the creation of media, the “central site for cultural and political stuggle.”106
Law dictates that 70 percent of a community station’s programming must be created by
volunteers rather than station staff, and furthermore, employees of private mass media, party
officials, nor military members can serve as community media directors.107 The community
media are intended to be places for ordinary citizens to fill the gaps of mass media coverage
with the stories they want and need. This is epitomized in Catia TVe’s slogan “¡No vea
televisión, hágala!” – “Don’t watch television, make it!”108
To summarize, privately owned mass media is a traditional stronghold for the
opposition in Venezuela, at times openly hostile and even subversive toward the elected
Chavista government. From the other side, Chávez exhibited hostile behavior toward the media
as well. I don’t attempt to argue that criticisms of Chávez’s treatment of the press are
unfounded – media laws in Bolivarian Venezuela cast a wide net for offensive content and
Chávez’s penchant for publicly berating the press, sometimes as individuals, was cause for
concern. Rather, I argue that the private mass media of Venezuela themselves abandoned their
role as objective public servants and thus put Venezuela’s free press in harm’s way.
Furthermore, new journalistic voices in the form of community media were actually fostered
under Chávez. Criticisms of press freedom in Venezuela that focus only on the threats to private
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media outlets have not presented the more complicated picture that was the media landscape
under Chávez.
The private mass media, owned by and connected to old party elites, actively sided
against the Chávez government, which stripped away the traditional power of old Venezuelan
elites. This power shift in the country’s politics also threatened to rob the U.S. of its traditional
power in the country and perhaps even the region, should Chávez’s ideas continue to spread
beyond the borders of Venezuela. Oil management policies under Chávez were moving further
and further away from the liberalization and opening to foreign investor influence his
immediate predecessors had begun to pursue. Those who benefitted from liberal oil
management and Punto Fijo power structures were also those with influence in the world of
Venezuelan private mass media. It follows, then, that sentiment in the U.S. would support the
private mass media in its conflict with Chávez, not necessarily because officials of the U.S.
government have a primary interest in protecting the Venezuelan independent press, but
because the independent Venezuelan press is a link in the chain of protecting the interests of
the U.S.
This subordination of democratic principles – particularly the independence of the press
– to the extension or protection of economic and political influence is a pattern in U.S. relations
with Latin America. This pattern emerges in individual studies of U.S. government action in the
revolutionary projects of Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973.
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V. Guatemala Case Study
On June 18, 1954, rebel forces entered Guatemala in a coup bent on overthrowing
President Jacobo Arbenz Gúzman. Led by exiled military man Carlos Castillo Armas, the invasion
force would succeed in displacing the democratically elected Arbenz, replacing him with Castillo
himself as Guatemala’s executive.109 Organized and supported by the Central Intelligence
Agency, the coup came as a response to the supposedly communist-dominated Arbenz regime,
which President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called “a danger and a
threat.”110 However, when taking into consideration the Cold War-influenced pattern of U.S.
political thought during the period of Guatemala’s revolution (1944-1954) and closely
examining the demonstrated realities of the Guatemalan revolutionary governments, it appears
that communism’s influence on the Guatemalan government was overestimated by the U.S.
government –in part as a strategy for defending U.S. business and political interests in the
region.
To understand the revolutionary period in Guatemala beginning with its first democratic
elections, it is necessary to examine the circumstances the country was under during the
autocratic rule of Gen. Jorge Ubico, the government overturned in the revolution. Ubico
controlled the state from 1931 to 1944 with the support of the nation’s land-owning elite, and
during this time foreign investment in Guatemala, especially from the U.S., was allowed to
flourish, receiving “substantial concessions” from Ubico’s government that enabled economic
domination. Three U.S. enterprises in particular held the lion’s share of influence of the
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Guatemalan market – United Fruit Company, International Railways of Central America, and
Electric Bond and Share.111 During the dictatorship of Ubico, 72 percent of the nation’s land was
concentrated in the hands of just two percent of landowners.112 In addition, a large amount of
this farm land was uncultivated, and the country depended on imports for basic domestic
needs.113 Wages for laborers were extremely low – just cents per day – and the country’s large
population of indigenous people was forced to work a required minimum of 150 days per year,
some without any pay at all.114 Guatemala under Ubico was a goldmine for U.S. business
interests, and a grave for the nation’s own economic and social development.
Ubico was forced from office in 1944 by popular protests and a resignation demanded
by influential citizens.115 After a struggle to rid the country of the corrupt political elite intent on
maintaining the Ubico system, elections were held in December and Juan José Arévalo was
chosen as Guatemala’s first democratically elected president.116 Arévalo’s election heralded the
beginning of significant change in Guatemala and was accompanied by the institution of a new
constitution. The constitution legally consolidated fair, democratic rule, protected modern
social rights, and granted considerable power to the government over private property.117
Arévalo’s term was marked by labor reform, especially as it related to the urban working class.
The Labor Code of 1947 significantly changed the way the government related to employers
and employees, granting urban workers the right to unionize and created a court system
dedicated to solving conflict between workers and business owners. As Stephen Kinzer and
111

Gordon, p. 49.
Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit (Garden City, 1982) p. 38.
113
Gordon, p. 49.
114
Ibid, p. 48.
115
Kinzer and Schlesiner, p. 28.
116
Ibid, p. 30-31.
117
Ibid, p. 33.
112

Lamb 31
Stephen Schlesinger state in their book Bitter Fruit, “The underlying concept was that
government should no longer automatically support large farm owners and other
employers.”118
Not surprisingly, this attitude toward business stirred unease among the wealthy elite
and management of foreign corporations, who were accustomed to the absence of
governmental control. The reforms taking shape under Arévalo threatened the heretofore
unchallenged domination of U.S. corporations in the economy – the United Fruit Company was
the largest employer and landowner in Guatemala.119 The new ability for workers to organize
strikes unsettled the strict hold United Fruit had over its employees, and the Guatemalan
government was sympathetic to the plight of the workers rather than the company.120 The
anger stirred by the labor code rippled through Washington thanks to United Fruit’s many
governmental connections.121 Communism became a buzzword for U.S. politicians and
businessmen. As paraphrased by Max Gordon in his examination of the Guatemalan coup,
Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican senator, proclaimed before the U.S. Senate that “the
Guatemalan labor code had been devised to discriminate against United Fruit, and the
Company faced a ‘serious economic breakdown’ because of communist-influenced activity.”122
Communism was a growing political base in Guatemala, expressing most of its influence
through the labor union system, but as Gordon argues, its “political influence on a government
level was generally slight.”123 Arévalo, who had already decried communism as a political
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position,124 even acquiesced to Washington’s insistence that he repress communist
organization.125 Nonetheless, “anticommunist cold war hysteria” proliferating in the U.S. meant
any activity resembling communism, especially that which could directly affect U.S. interests in
the Western Hemisphere, was a threat.126 When the 1950 elections brought the more radical
revolutionary Jacobo Arbenz to the head of Guatemalan politics, the environment was ripening
for a grand clash between Guatemala and its powerful neighbor in the north.
Captain Jacobo Arbenz Gúzman was democratically elected in 1950 and officially
stepped into the presidency in March 1951.127 The president moved forward with projects he
hoped would “transform Guatemala into a modern capitalist state,” and bring about economic
independence from “the U.S. corporations dominating it.”128 The projects included a new
highway from the capital to the Atlantic coast of the country, a new Atlantic port, a stateowned hydroelectric plant, and significant agrarian reform.129 All of these projects would
compete with monopolies over transport and exportation, power, and land held by the major
U.S. enterprises in Guatemala. Kinzer and Schlesinger describe this as a “strategy … to limit the
power of foreign companies through direct competition rather than nationalization,”130 a rather
capitalist approach.
On June 27, 1952, Decree 900, Arbenz’s agrarian reform law, was enacted.131 The law
allowed the government to expropriate unproductive land from farms larger than 223 acres for
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rental in smaller plots to landless peasants, and the former owners would be compensated
according to the land’s declared tax value in 1952.132 Only a little more than a year into his
presidency, Arbenz was going toe-to-toe with a U.S. giant, the United Fruit Company, which lost
240,000 acres on the Pacific coast and 173,000 on the Atlantic – all of which was uncultivated.
The value offered for the land according to the company’s own tax valuation, was $600,000.
Outraged, the company demanded more than $15,000,000 for its Pacific coast property alone.
The U.S. State Department would later back up this claim formally. 133 But United Fruit was not
the only target of expropriation. Arbenz took land from his own estate and that of his foreign
minister, Guillermo Toriello, among other large estates. About 100,000 families were granted
land over the law’s 18-month tenure.134 It is estimated that distributions across the nation
totaled 1,500,000 acres.135
As Guatemala’s land reform was taking shape, political changes occurred in the U.S. as
well. Dwight Eisenhower ascended to the presidency at the start of 1953, in the midst of the
agrarian reform expropriations, with a foreign policy staff dominated by those with close ties to
the United Fruit Company.136 In the eyes of U.S. politicians and businessmen, the attack on
United Fruit holdings in Guatemala correlated with increased subversive communist influence
in the country, a thought pattern that would have been bolstered by the high Cold War
tensions in the U.S.137 Workers’ strikes against the company and pressure from the Guatemalan
government for contract renegotiation were being replicated in Honduras, Panama, and Costa
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Rica, placing United Fruit at risk far beyond simply losing acreage in Guatemala. This growing
unrest emanating from the Guatemalan agrarian reform law “led the U.S. State Department to
conclude that United Fruit interests in all Central America were threatened by the Arbenz
government’s policies,” says Gordon.138 Patience in the U.S. government for the Guatemalan
government was running short, and by mid-1953, pieces were already being put into place to
remove the dangerous Arbenz from power.
Max Gordon’s examination provides additional factors that would have pushed the U.S.
to such extreme measures in Guatemala. In addition to direct conflict with major business
interests, the Arbenz regime threatened to serve as an example of economic independence to
other Latin American nations, which could balloon the threat to U.S. business and political
interests in the region. Also during the final years of the revolutionary period, Europe was
recovering from the disruption of World War II and was “competing aggressively” in Latin
America. If the United Fruit Company was weakened throughout the region by economic
independence of nations critical to its production, this competition could be devastating. 139
Another motivation was the desire for access to raw materials in Latin America, which the State
Department feared would be hindered by “ultranationalism.” Finally, Eisenhower ran for office
on the promise to “roll-back” communism, and Guatemala provided a proving ground for that
promise within easy reach, whether or not the communism found there was a significant
threat.140
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The CIA began actively working toward the overthrow of Arbenz in summer of 1953, and
declassified documents report a budget of $3 million for the task.141 Actions taken by the
agency with the authorization of offices of the U.S. government include the training of an
invasion force in Nicaragua, clandestine propaganda radio broadcasting, and air operations that
including bombing runs.142 This report from the CIA claims the U.S. opposition to the Arbenz
government was in response to Communist influence in his administration and “a hardening
anti-U.S. policy … which was targeted directly against American interests in the country.”143
Here it is evident that U.S. motivation to combat communism as part of the Cold War mentality
went hand in hand with efforts to maintain hegemonic control in the political and economic
spheres of Latin America in service of U.S. interests.
According to the United States Information Agency, popular opinion in Latin America
during Arbenz’s tenure was not helpful to U.S. interest in his overthrow, “either regarding the
Arbenz regime as a ‘homegrown’ revolutionary movement dedicated to improving the lot of the
exploited Guatemalans, or preferring to dwell on the United Fruit issue and speculate as to
United States motives of economic imperialism.”144 As a result, aggressive use of media and
anti-communist propaganda was another prominent feature of the subversive tactics leading
up to the June invasion. A report on actions taken in Guatemala reveals that much focus was
placed on “creating greater awareness throughout the Hemisphere of the real threat to peace
and security posed by the verifiable communist penetration of the Guatemalan
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government.”145 To this end, further plans of action as detailed in a June 1954 memo included
“faked kidnappings of prominent Guatemalan citizens and the desecration of Guatemalan
churches with pro-communist slogans.”146
As the position against Guatemala intensified, so did clandestine media efforts. The
declassified report of actions by U.S. Information Agency in Guatemala during the coup year
states that it planted articles denouncing Guatemalan communists in media outlets in the
region with false source attribution.147 Later in the year, a four-week period yielded “more than
200 articles, backgrounders, and scripts,” for international distribution. Anti-communist
propaganda was sent abroad numbering nearly 27,000 items. These items created by USIA
were often distributed to the public with no attribution to the true author, seeming to emanate
from local outlets themselves.148 However, because many Guatemalans were illiterate, the CIA
also enlisted the help of the Guatemalan Catholic Church to communicate anti-Communist
propaganda from the pulpit.149
Another very important piece of the media infiltration effort by U.S. government
organizations like USIA and the CIA was radio broadcast. The CIA reports that it created a radio
station in Nicaragua “to intimidate members of the Communist Party and public officials who
were sympathetic to the Communist cause.”150 This station, calling itself The Voice of
Liberation, began broadcasting in Guatemala in the beginning of May of 1954 and passed itself
off as the “mouthpiece for Guatemalan exiles who would shortly return to free their
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country.”151 The station – financed by the CIA and run by CIA-trained operators – claimed it
broadcast from within the country, close to the capital of Guatemala City, although it remained
well outside the reach of Guatemalan authorities. The station broadcast to a growing audience
through the summer, serving the counterrevolutionary goal of moving public opinion in
Guatemala against Arbenz and in favor of his removal.152
Castillo Armas’s forces, a few hundred strong, entered Guatemala on June 18, 1954,
heralded by CIA-authored radio broadcasts calling for the Guatemalan people to rally behind
the incoming “Liberation Movement.” One declassified broadcast from the CIA – its true origin
flatly denied and authorship attributed to the “National Liberation Committee” – instructs
listeners of every level of influence on how to lend their support to the overthrow cause,
additionally declaring the invasion to be the harbinger of “a truly democratic order,” and
identifying the Arbenz regime with “the forces of darkness, communist conspiracy, and Soviet
Russian imperialist expansion.”153 Bombing from “U.S. planes flown by U.S. pilots hired by the
CIA,”154 constituted the majority of the violent action, and Arbenz gave in when faced with
alienation from his army leadership who personally delivered the demand for his resignation.
The physical bombing attacks were supplemented by psychological attacks via Voice of
Liberation broadcasts, which were aired in Guatemala City to the exclusion of other radio voices
thanks to signal jamming from the CIA. The only information available was coming from the
coup plotters themselves, and they reported the imminent defeat of Arbenz thanks to
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“relentless advances of well-equipped divisions of rebel troops.”155 A few days after the
beginning of the invasion, the radio station was able to recruit a Guatemalan deserter to its
service and broadcast a secretly recorded and edited appeal from the pilot for other members
of the Guatemalan military to join the rebel cause.156 From then on, Arbenz kept his military on
the ground for fear of more desertions.157 Richard H. Immerman states that the effort of the
Voice of Liberation to propagate the rebel threat was one of the crucial factors that ultimately
sealed Arbenz’s fate. “Had the Guatemalans not fallen for the Voice of Liberation’s ruse,” he
writes, “Arbenz’s government undoubtedly would have survived.”158
But neither Arbenz’s government nor Guatemala’s democracy survived the CIAsponsored onslaught, and when all was said and done Castillo Armas himself was placed at the
helm of the nation through the diplomatic direction of U.S. Ambassador John Peurifoy.159 The
years that followed saw Guatemala return to the poverty-stricken, semi-feudal economy it had
been prior to the 1944 revolution. The revolutionary constitution was done away with, agrarian
reform was repealed, unions were dissolved, freedoms of expression were suspended, and
there was widespread persecution of potential opposition to the new government, members of
the Arbenz administration, and peasant cooperative workers.160 In October, months after the
coup, Peurifoy spoke before a Congressional committee in favor of the Castillo Armas
government, saying he hoped U.S. aid would continue flowing into Guatemala “so that
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Guatemala may resume its place as a prosperous and progressive member in the family of free
nations.”161
Use of the media to affect public opinion was not limited to the area of conflict itself. At
home in the U.S., the anti-Arbenz government line was published in major media outlets.
Heightened Cold War sensitivities during this time period meant that any news item related to
communism was of great importance to publishers, so the situation in Guatemala attracted
attention from media.162 New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger visited Guatemala in
1949 and subsequently assigned reporters to the country to cover the developments, which
according to Immerman “broke the news of the events in Guatemala to the United States
public.”163 Coverage of Guatemala and UFCO picked up in many major publications, including
Time, Saturday Evening Post, and U.S. News & World Report.164 The “cold war ethos” as
Immerman calls it, meant that the villany of Communism was so deeply entrenched that
coverage of anything resembling it would naturally be negative, no matter the story’s source.165
However, a major source of information for journalists reporting on the Guatemalan
situation was the United Fruit Company itself. Father of modern public relations Edward
Bernays was the public relations advisor for United Fruit Company in its fight against the Arbenz
government and its allegedly communist policies.166 After the election of Arbenz, Bernays led a
cadre of publishers on a mission to Guatemala for reporting purposes. During this invite-only
affair, UFCO was able to show off the Guatemala it wished the U.S. public to see. Later, Bernays
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called the media coverage of Guatemala “masterpieces of objective reporting.”167 Bernays and
UFCO, as Immerman suggests, were not out to control the media, however. Editors and
publishers drew conclusions favorable to UFCO interests on their own. To this point, Immerman
includes an example of an interview conducted by Samuel Guy Inman with Arévalo in 1950 that
was offered for publication to several major U.S. outlets but was summarily rejected. In the
interview Arévalo “distinguished his views from the Communists’ and lamented the slanted
reporting in the United States.”168
While reporting on Guatemala may not have been explicitly controlled to reflect the
interests of UFCO or the U.S. government in Guatemala, reporters did rely on sources with a
clear bias in the conflict – like the office of Bernays - in their coverage. This, combined with the
prevailing dominant attitudes toward Communism at the time, means the coverage reflected
anti-revolution sentiment intentionally or not. There is at least one instance, however, where
shaping of media coverage appears to bear the fingerprints of official control. In his
examination of the mid- to late-20th century New York Times, journalist Harrison Salisbury
discusses the way political intrigue and press coverage were intertwined in “the Gruson affair”
of 1954.169
Sydney Gruson, the Times man in Mexico City at the time, had been covering the
Guatemala situation closely when in early June of 1954 he was instructed by his editor not to
return to Guatemala and remain for the time being in Mexico, where he had returned for a
short personal trip. Gruson was told there might be Mexican involvement in the coup rumored
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to be brewing.170 The order flowed from misgivings about Gruson in Guatemala voiced by Allen
Dulles, director of the CIA, to a confidant of Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger, who passed
along the order for Gruson to stay out of the way in Mexico.171 Apparently, Gruson was
determined to be a liability to the efforts of the CIA in engineering the coup, particularly in
keeping the U.S. hand in the affair secret. Dulles and the CIA chose to paint Gruson as a political
threat, concocting information that suggested Gruson could be a “security risk,” which Salisbury
says was enough for Sulzberger to pull him to the sidelines.172 In reality, Salisbury argues,
“Gruson was too good a reporter. He knew too much. He was too capable of uncovering the
truth.”173
The U.S. response to the Guatemalan revolution is a prime example of the way media
has come into play when U.S. economic and political interests in Latin America are threatened.
The defense of principles of press freedom is not high on the list of action priorities in the face
of challenged business interests and potentially devastating blows to U.S. hegemony. This is
seen in the U.S. Information Agency and CIA manipulation of regional media, even to the point
of publishing false information to the public in pursuit of counterrevolutionary goals. Also seen
in this study of U.S. response to Guatemala’s revolution is the way U.S. media can be a
reflection of official U.S. government opinion rather than an objective analyst of world events.
The looming threat of communism in the midst of Cold War hysteria heightened the sense of
the danger Guatemala’s revolution posed and also made the situation highly newsworthy to
U.S. media. The combination of this dominant social attitude toward communism and the role
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of official sources in reporting on Guatemala cast the revolutionary government in a decidedly
negative light, whatever the on-the-ground reality in Guatemala was.

VI. Chile Case Study
The case of the United States response to the revolutionary government led by Salvador
Allende from 1970 until his violent overthrow in 1973 is an excellent example of the changing
U.S. government approach to South American problems as the twentieth century marched on –
moving from a direct, overt role as a player in the game of regime changes toward a backdoor
approach, choosing to covertly manipulate the playing field rather than become directly
involved. The Chilean situation is also an example of the increasingly globalized arena of Latin
America. In the view of both the U.S. and Allende, the success of Chile’s experiment with
democratic socialism held earthshaking implications for the status quo in Latin America.
This case study of Salvador Allende’s government and the U.S. involvement in its
overthrow will focus on the economic nature of U.S. interests in Chile and the U.S. covert
participation in mass media playing a “significant role”174 in fomenting the coup that would put
General Augusto Pinochet in charge of the military junta that then governed the country from
1973 to 1988. When examining the U.S. business interests in Chile, the Nixon administration’s
political interests, and the manipulation of private mass media to undermine a constitutional,
democratically-elected government, it becomes clear that private media are not always
incorruptible bastions of objective truth and the priorities of the U.S. government do not begin
with the defense of democracy.
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In Chile’s election of 1970, Salvador Allende, a three-time failure at the presidential
polls, squeaked into office with a plurality of 36.4 percent over his two rival candidates. 175
Representing the party “Unidad Popular” (UP) – translated as “Popular Unity” – Allende ran on
the promise to implement a democratic, institutionalized shift to socialism in his country, “La
Vía Chilena.” In Washington, the unexpected Allende victory stirred panic that a challenge to
the status quo in Latin America could succeed. As then U.S. President Nixon said in a now
declassified conversation with the National Security Council immediately following Allende’s
election, “Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he can consolidate himself and the
picture projected to the world will be his success… No impression should be permitted in Latin
America that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this way.”176 Allende’s program
represented not just an isolated challenge to U.S. interests, but a regional, if not global, threat
to the influence of the superpower.
Beyond the explicit political implications for U.S. influence should the contagion of
Allende’s democratic socialism catch on, the economic dominance of the United States in Latin
America was also deeply threatened. Centered on the welfare of the working class population
of Chile, a primary tenet of Allende’s program was the nationalization of lucrative industries in
Chile. Allende considered freedom from imperialist economic controls to be “a necessary
precursor to political independence.”177 When Allende ascended to the presidency,
multinational corporations – including more than 100 from the U.S, 24 of which were among

175

Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, 2011, p. 50.
Kornbluh, p. 79.
177
Harmer, p. 77.
176

Lamb 44
the 30 highest ranking multinationals from the U.S. – had a tight grip on the Chilean
economy.178
These U.S.-based corporations relied on large chunks of income flowing from operations
abroad, as much as 40 percent. Additionally, many of these multinationals operating in Chile
were highly regarded contractors for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1970, when Allende’s
threat to capitalism commanded attention.179 These facts side by side suggest an intimate
connection between “U.S. military’s defense of corporate interests overseas against the forces
of nationalism and socialism,”180 and the growth and prosperity of U.S.-based multinational
corporations.
The Chilean economy in 1970 was dominated by foreign capital. Sectors under U.S.
multinational corporation control included: 50 percent of machinery and equipment, 60
percent of industrial/chemical industries, 100 percent of automotive assembly, almost 100
percent of radio and television, 100 percent of copper fabrication, and 90 percent of
advertising.181 Copper exports were the primary foreign exchange earner for the Chilean
economy – at 75 percent182 - and in 1970, 80 percent of copper production in Chile was held in
the hands of U.S. corporations183 – namely Anaconda Copper and Kennecott Copper. In 1969,
one year prior to Allende’s election, around 80 percent of Anaconda’s profits flowed from its
mines in Chile.184 International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) was another U.S.-based
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corporation with lucrative holdings in Chile, reportedly holding $153 million in Chilean assets in
the early 1970s.185
How do these massive businesses connect to the United States government and its
interests? U.S. multinational corporations were insured by the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation against expropriation, but when OPIC’s reserves fall short of the funds required to
service claims – as was the case in Chile – Congress has to get involved to cover the deficit.186 As
researchers David Eisenhower and Dale L. Johnson state in a 1973 article covering this
entanglement of interests, “This insurance automatically makes any dispute over the amount of
compensation for nationalized investment a conflict between an agency of the U.S. government
and the government of another country.”187 Needless to say, the U.S. government’s endgame in
this matchup was the protection of its coffers against the payment of insurance claims and the
protection of overseas corporations that are repatriating enormous profits back into its own
economy. It’s important to remember, also, that the economic threats of Allende’s socialism
and nationalization campaigns were rooted in the fear of their contagion. The U.S. government
and these multinational corporations stood to lose significant capital in Chile, but if Allende was
allowed to succeed, the losses could ripple out regionally and globally.
The economic branch of the U.S. government’s response to the threat of Allende took
the form of an exploitation of the Chilean economy’s enormous dependence on U.S. capital and
aid. Rather than jump in to directly back up corporate interests, the Nixon administration
adopted an “overall strategy of controlled escalation of hostile measures,” which involved
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blocking credit to Chile by flexing the muscles of U.S. power in institutions like the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank and identifying the economic failures with the
Allende government’s policies while maintaining a public attitude of negotiation and
compromise188
This tangled web of economic and political interests that characterizes U.S. relations in
Chile, and I would argue in Latin America increasingly throughout the century, is reflected in a
1971 statement from Peter Peterson, the director of the Council on International Economic
Policy, an agency created by President Nixon in 1971 to shape policy decisions and uphold the
interests of foreign investors. In a report to the president, Peterson said, “In an increasingly
economic, interdependent and competitive era, we shall also find increasingly that economics is
politics.”189
In addition to manipulating controls on the Chilean economy to sow the seeds of an
internal rejection of Allende and his path to socialism, the U.S. government’s approach also
relied on exerting control over Chilean society by means of covertly befriending and bolstering
the efforts of the internal opposition to Allende. This covert destabilization and disaggregation
of the Chilean state would be the realm of the CIA. The targets for closer ties with Washington
were contacts in the Chilean military, the conservative faction of the Christian Democratic
Party, counterrevolutionary political parties in general, and the private-sector business
communities. The means of infiltration: money. Contributions in the millions flowed from the
CIA to opposition sectors in Chile during Allende’s time in the presidency.190 The Church
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Committee Report on the covert actions taken in Chile record spendings of $8 million between
the years of Allende’s election and his overthrow.191 Some of those subversion dollars would be
directly authorized by Nixon himself.192
A campaign that played what the CIA termed “a significant role” in engineering the coup
that violently removed Salvador Allende from office in 1973 was the “El Mercurio project.”193
Owner of El Mercurio Agustín Edwards was considered one of the richest men in Chile as the
head of a media powerhouse. Edwards was against Allende’s project from the start and per the
declassification of CIA files detailing the covert actions taken against the Allende administration
by Washington, he made a visit to Washington in hopes of finding allies in an Allende overthrow
before the latter was sworn in to the office.194 The records show that Edwards was lobbying for
preparations for a military coup in September of 1970, following Allende’s victory by a slim
plurality, to prevent Allende from ever reaching the executive office.195 After Allende’s victory
was ratified by the Chilean Congress, however, Edwards’ paper would be the centerpiece of the
anti-Allende propaganda campaign conducted by the CIA throughout his presidency, even
becoming one of the “most militant parts of the opposition.”196
The economic downturn throughout 1971 exacerbated an already poor financial
situation for El Mercurio. The financial failings were a result many factors, including the general
economic downturn as a result of the “invisible blockade” being waged against Chile’s economy
by Edwards’ U.S. allies, the paper’s own errors in management, and Allende’s declining
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advertising patronage in obedience to a law enacted by his legislature, which was controlled by
the opposition parties.197 Edwards placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Unidad
Popular administration, accusing UP of “deliberately trying to shut down the opposition media
in Chile.”198 El Mercurio’s cries of oppression at the hands of Allende meant “the freedom of
the press issue was the single most important theme in the international propaganda campaign
against Allende.”199 The Church Committee report on covert action in Chile records that the
issue was publicized by the “major opposition research organization,” for the attention of the
Inter-American Press Association in 1972, which declared “freedom of the press was
threatened” in Chile during the Allende years.200
This use of the IAPA as a vehicle for international criticism of Allende draws out
interesting conflicts of interest. Agustín Edwards served as president of the Inter-American
Press Association from 1968 to 1969, just one year before Allende’s socialist path was voted
into power. Additionally, Fred Simon Landis – a consultant to the Church Committee’s
investigation of CIA action in Chile – argues, the international network of publications and
publishers had CIA agents within its ranks. According to Landis, the agency had “five agents
working as media executives at El Mercurio”201 in 1969 before they were later promoted to
positions on the IAPA’s Board of Directors.202 Edwards’ association with the IAPA such a short
time before his paper partnered with the CIA to overthrow Allende – and later uphold the
Pinochet regime – and the alleged presence of intelligence agents in influential positions within
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the organization casts considerable doubt on the objectivity of IAPA’s opinions of Chile’s press
freedom.
Already having been a line item in the CIA’s budget for many years, El Mercurio reached
out to the agency in late 1971 with a request for “covert support totaling $1 million” to
maintain operation.203 The CIA presented two options to Henry Kissinger, head of the Nixon
administration’s National Security Council: pay up and hope that it’s enough to keep the paper
going, or let it fold and “arrange a maximum propaganda effort on the issue of freedom of the
press.”204 Ultimately, it was Nixon who settled the debate among his policy makers by
personally authorizing an initial $700,000 of CIA funds to prop up El Mercurio as a center of
opposition hostility, the remaining $300,000 following a month later by the hand of Kissinger.
Within less than a year, Washington would send another $965,000 in El Mercurio support.205
Additionally, El Mercurio was receiving covert funds funneled through the U.S.-based industry
giant International Telephone and Telegraph, one declassified memo discussing $100,000 being
deposited from the company to Edwards.206
During the Allende years, El Mercurio “positioned itself as a bullhorn of organized
agitation against the government,” according to Peter Kornbluh in his examination of the
declassified documents on Washington’s actions in Chile.207 But in addition to its own editorial
stance in opposition to Allende, a result of its owner’s rank in the business elite that stood to
lose from the progressing socialist march and its long standing funding relationship with
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decidedly anti-Allende external forces, El Mercurio also published material created by the CIA
for dissemination through media.208 The paper even went so far as to publish an editorial in
June 1973, three months before the coup, denouncing Allende, the constitutional president,
and “essentially calling for insurrection.”209
It’s difficult to look at this evidence and consider El Mercurio to be an independent
source of news and opinion in Chile. The paper’s effectiveness in fomenting a violent coup
atmosphere was compared by the CIA to the most extreme right-wing groups, including the
“neo-fascist paramilitary group Patria y Libertad.”210 El Mercurio was a mouthpiece for the
highest levels of the opposition to Allende, namely the United States government and the
internal opposition parties of Chile, claiming to fight against an undemocratic administration it
accused of attacking the fundamental right to a free press while actively throwing in its lot to
incite the extra-constitutional overthrow of the democratically elected president of what had
been the most stable democracy in Latin America.
The U.S. government’s opposition to Allende penetrated not only the internal Chilean
press, but also the U.S. press covering the events in Chile. A 1973 article by John C Pollock and
David Eisenhower examines the key themes expressed in U.S. media coverage of the Allende
government in Chile from his election to the beginning of 1972. The themes put forth, Pollock
and Eisenhower contend, are in contradiction to the evidence of the true situation in Chile.211
The coverage examined is judged to lead readers to believe five particular assumptions: “Chile’s
socialist president is isolated,” “Threats to the political system come exclusively from the Left,”
208
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The middle and upper classes are repositories of political wisdom,” “Chile’s effort to diminish
foreign corporate influence is irrational,” and that Allende is leading Chile into “impending
disaster.”212 These themes are presented in varying ways, explicit and not, Pollock and
Eisenhower argue.213
The question then becomes: Why would the U.S. media take up this mantle of
opposition to Allende and his democratic road to socialism? The article argues that the press is
following the path blazed by corporate interests, not through backroom collusions and or
“conspiracy,” but in light of the “widely shared, historical U.S. assumption that private property
is sacrosanct.”214 Allende’s socialism was perceived as a threat to the world the U.S. media sees
itself as defending, and Pollock and Eisenhower argue the louder the complaints from
businesses get, the more virulent the language and coverage of his government become. 215
In conclusion, this study of U.S. action in Chile makes it clear that the motivation of U.S.
government involvement in Chile was not the strengthening of democracy. Rather the selfproclaimed leader of the free world was willing to sacrifice democracy upon the altar of U.S.
political and economic interests in the region. This is seen in the evidence of the Nixon
administration’s fear of the spread of Allende’s democratic, socialist success in his socialist
experiment and the U.S. manipulation of internal media sources through a covertly funded
propaganda campaign. This pursuit of strength at all costs would lead the U.S. government to
allow Allende’s successor Pinochet to hold a bloody grip on Chile for 17 years after the end of
Chilean democracy, defying human as well as civil rights at every turn. This episode is also
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significant for U.S.-Latin American relations moving forward, as the art of external opposition
moves into the realm of economic pressures rather than overt military force. Finally, the
Chilean example also shows the way U.S. media is swayed by dominant political and economic
belief systems, its coverage reflective of the corporate and government interests rather than
holding them to account. These points offer a historical example with which to compare the
U.S. media opposition to the Chavista government of Venezuela as the examination of
criticisms of press freedom in the country moves forward.

VII. Conclusion
When placed side by side, the Guatemalan, Chilean, and Venezuelan revolutionary
experiences all show patterns of negative coverage and criticism from media associated with
perceived threats to the U.S. In each situation, U.S. business interests and hegemonic influence
in Latin America stood to lose ground if the revolutionary project were to succeed, and in each
situation media was used as a bullhorn for the counter-revolutionary aims – i.e. the return to
privately held resources and business enterprise rather than the nationalization and
redistribution of power or wealth away from the country’s traditional elites. It has been
historically proven in both Guatemala and Chile that this alignment of attitudes between the
U.S. businesses and government was no accident. Covert operations in both countries co-opted
the mass media for purposes of orchestrating the overthrow of a legitimate government. There
are traces of connections between media in Venezuela and U.S. entities as well, although this
may be revealed in years to come as having little actual influence on the actions of private
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media in that context. Even so, the Venezuelan media has proven its own propensity to take up
arms against Chavismo with or without the U.S. government as a puppeteer directing its moves.
Additionally, the Guatemalan, Chilean, and Venezuelan situations illustrate the
willingness of the U.S. government to break with democratic process if it benefits them to do
so, despite outward claims to be working for the promotion of democracy in the region. This is
shown by the U.S. government’s tolerance of the violent, oppressive military regimes that
followed the downfall of democratically elected presidents in Guatemala and Chile, and by the
Bush administration’s immediate recognition of the temporary replacement for Chávez during
the military coup that unconstitutionally removed him from power in 2002. Understanding this
context of U.S. attitudes and actions in the region, criticisms from U.S. sources of violations of
the democratic principle of a free press by an administration like that of Chávez, who was am
openly anti-imperialist influence in his country and the region, must be questioned. While real
issues and challenges to democratic institutions may be present, historical precedent would
suggest that in the case of relations with Latin America, democracy and the protection of rights
associated with it is a tertiary goal of the U.S. hierarchy after goals of maintaining hegemonic
political influence and protecting economic interests.
Furthermore, in each case, there is a harmony between U.S. media coverage of
revolution and the dominant attitude from the U.S. government and U.S.-based corporations.
Looking back at the way U.S. media covered reform and revolution in Guatemala and Chile casts
doubt on the objectivity of U.S. media coverage of Venezuela. The antagonist may have
changed, but the patterns of casting redistributive policies in a negative light and the adherence
to the official line from U.S. government, business, or non-profit officials remain the same.
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Intentionally biased or not, criticisms of the Chávez government’s treatment of the press must
be viewed as one side of the story, told by characters with an interest in seeing the Bolivarian
Revolution crumble.
Venezuela’s press may or may not be “Not Free,” – that’s not the central point of
debate here. What is, however, is the motivation behind the presentation of press oppression
in Venezuela by major U.S. media. With an understanding of the way the halls of power in the
U.S. have perceived Latin American revolutions as political and economic threats, the ultimate
goals of the U.S. government in its relations to Latin American countries in general, and the way
those opinions and objectives have found purchase in U.S. and foreign media in the past, one
must begin to question the objectivity of news from U.S. press related to revolutionary or
reformist movements in Latin America.
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